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COMMENT
EPSTEIN AND LEVMORE:
OBJECTIONS FROM THE RIGHT?
EMILY SHERWIN* & MAIMON ScHwARzscHLD**

The papers we are commenting on are quite different in subject
and point of view. Richard Epstein's paper is a wide-ranging discussion of the role of benefit in private and public law, while Saul
Levmore looks closely at one instance of benefit-based recovery.
What the papers have in common is the question of when and why the
focus of legal rules shifts from harm to benefit-from compensation
to restitution.
Restitution is a slippery term, and it may help at the outset to
clarify how it is being used here. In one sense of the word, restitution
is a principle of responsibility that comes into play when one person
benefits unfairly at another's expense. The common shorthand phrase
for this idea is "unjust enrichment."' In the more technical sense of
the word, restitution is a set of legal remedies that measure liability by
gains received rather than losses imposed.2 The two articles before us
*

Professor of Law, University of San Diego. J.D. 1981, Boston University School of

Law.
** Professor of Law, University of San Diego. Barrister of Lincoln's Inn, London. B.A.
1973, J.D. 1976, Columbia University.
Thanks to Larry Alexander, Gail Heriot, Stephen Perry, and Christopher Wonnell for helpful comments.
1. See JOHN P. DAWSON, UNJUsT ENRicHMENr 1-8 (1951); 1 GEORGE PALMER, THE LAW
OF REsTrruroN § 1.2 (1978). Professor Dawson said: "To the person who has suffered loss, the
loss alone is a grievance. But if the loss can be located and identified in the gain received by
another, the anguish caused by the loss will be felt as more than doubled." DAWSON, supra,at 5;
see also REsTATEmENT OF RnsTrnrON § 1 (1937) (discussing the principle of restitution);
PALMER, supra, § 1.1 (1978) (same).
2. See, eg., RsrATEmENT OF REm~ruTON, supra note 1, §§ 150-59 (1937); DAN B.
DOBBS, LAW OF REmEDiEs 365-66 (2d ed. 1993); PALMER, supra note 1, §§ 1.2-1.4, 2.12. Most
often, the effect of this measure of liability is to convert a liability rule into a property rule: If a
wrongdoer expects to gain more than the victim will lose, a benefit-based measure of liability

1451
HeinOnline -- 67 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1451 1993-1994

1452

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:1451

are primarily about restitution in the first sense: unjust enrichment as
a reason for imposing liability.
Unjust enrichment entered the legal vocabulary at a time when
law was secure in its premises and was little troubled by the attentions
of economists and other theorists.3 Restitution was set in motion by

the receipt of benefits, and the greatest difficulty was determining
when retention of a benefit was unjust.4 There were problems in mea-

suring benefits, 5 but no one seemed to question that conferring a
"benefit" meant something different from inflicting a "loss." 6 Now, in
a climate more skeptical of legal formulas and more receptive to social
science, the very notions of gain and loss on which unjust enrichment
depends are open to question.7 This problem surfaces in both of these
articles, though in rather different ways.
I. RICHARD EPSTEIN ON THE BENEFIT PRINCIPLE
Our first comment on Richard Epstein's paper has to do with the
problem of "baseline." 8 Gains and losses must be defined in reference
to some state of affairs that serves as a neutral, or "baseline," position.
Only with the aid of this baseline can we describe some events as
provides a full deterrent rather than an option to act and bear the loss. See Guido Calabresi &
A. Douglas Melamed, PropertyRules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:One View of the Cathedral,85 HARv. L. Rnv. 1089, 1106-10 (1972).
3. The Restatement of Restitution, published in 1937, gathered remedies for unjust enrichment together for the first time under the heading of restitution. See PALMER, supra note 1,
§ 1.1, at 4.
4. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, supra note 1, § 1 cmts. a, c, § 2 cmt. a; PALMER,
supra note 1, § 1.7, at 40-41. A benefit, according to the Restatement, is any form of "advantage." RESTATEmENT OF REsTrrUToN, supra note 1, § 1 cmt. b.
5. Benefits can be valued in quite different ways, depending on the perspective from
which they are viewed. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTIUTON, supra note 1, §§ 150-59. Compare
Olwell v. Nye & Nissen Co., 173 P.2d 652 (Wash. 1946) (measuring benefit in terms of profit in a
case of misappropriation) with Somerville v. Jacobs, 170 S.E.2d 805 (W.Va. 1969) (measuring
benefit in terms of subjective value in a case of benefit conferred by mistake).
6. The restaters counted saving another from loss as one way of conferring a benefit, but
they never suggested that refraining from harm could be a benefit. See RESTATEMENT OF R~r.
TUTnoN, supra note 1, § I cmt. b. They were content to assume a background state of affairs that
would give meaning to the notion of "advantage."
7. See, e.g., Donald Wittman, Liability for Harm or Restitution for Benefit?, 13 J. LEOAL
STUD. 57 (1984) (discussing baselines from an economic point of view). Professor Dawson
seemed to anticipate this when he said that "[n]ot much reflection is required for one to discover
that at every point in this complex equation there are judgments of fairness and social policy,
even before one faces the critical question, when is enrichment 'unjust'?" John P. Dawson, Restitution or Damages?, 20 Osno ST. LJ. 175, 177 (1959).
8. Epstein discusses this in part II of his paper. Richard A. Epstein, The Ubiquity of the
Benefit Principle, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 1369, 1371-76 (1994).
HeinOnline -- 67 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1452 1993-1994

1994]

COMMENT ON EPSTEIN AND LEVMORE

1453

harms and some as benefits. Thus if A is legally entitled to an object,
B's use of it is a benefit to B. If B is entitled to the object, A's withholding it is a harm to B.9
Epstein does not deny this. He acknowledges that harms and
benefits are "parasitic on the choice of baselines" and gives the example of a tuition scholarship: If the amount of the scholarship is
reduced, is this a case of harm or of lesser benefit? 10 The interesting
point is that in the early sections of his paper, Epstein seems to say
that correct baselines can be discovered analytically, at least if we start
from a utilitarian position."
That claim is too broad. Utility may have something to say about
the assignment of entitlements and duties that define what counts as a
gain or a loss.' 2 For example, Epstein offers the problem of trade in
apples: We say that A must pay B for taking B's apples, and not that B
must pay A for not taking apples. This choice can easily be explained
in terms of utility, because the second system (treating not-taking as a
compensable benefit) would be very costly to administer and might
stifle the production of goods.' 3
Yet there are other "baseline" problems in which the line
between harm and benefit, or action and inaction, is not so easily amenable to utilitarian resolution. At least, the line cannot be defended
by utilitarian logic alone, without the aid of some preliminary assumptions. The best known example is the problem of incompatible land
9. See, eg., Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 2, at 1090-91. We have deliberately chosen
an example from private law, and our discussion of baselines is focused on private law. The
problem of selecting baselines becomes more complex when the benefit (or harm) at issue is a
certain level of government activity or support. See, e-g., RiCsARa A. EPsTmiN, BARGAING
wii THE STATE 75-103 (1993) [hereinafter EsTEiN, BARGAINING wrm THE STATE]; Richard
A. Epstein, Foreword-UnconstitutionalConditions, State Pdwer, and the Limits of Consent, 102
HA.v. L. REv. 4 (1988); Unconstitutional ConditionsSymposium, 26 SAN DiEGo L. REv. 175
(1989). In the public context, it probably is not possible to establish baselines without the aid of
a normative theory of the proper role of government. See Larry Alexander, UnderstandingConstitutionalRights in a World of OptionalBaselines, 26 SAN DiEGo L. REv. 175 (1989).
10. Epstein, supra note 8, at 1371-72.
11. Epstein says that:
One of the most common arguments against any consequentialist or broadly utilitarian
system is that it is indeterminate in its recommendation for legal rules. The effort
needed to argue that in the usual case a nontaking is conferring a benefit on those left
alone shows that this conclusion is manifestly false on the issues that concern us mostthe delineation of property rights in transactions for ordinary goods and services.
Epstein, supranote 8, at 1374; see EPsTaN, BARGnaINIG wrrH aT STATE, supranote 9, at 25-38
(making a similar suggestion).
12. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 2, at 1096-98.
13. Epstein, supra note 8, at 1373-74; see Wittman, supra note 7, at 69-70.
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uses: B's apple crop is stunted by smoke from A's factory next door.
Efficiency alone cannot explain the intuition that the factory is causing
harm, because a rule that B must pay for the benefit of smoke-free air
would in principle produce the same level of smoke prevention. 14
Perhaps more important are the cases in which a utilitarian calculation might, in theory, yield an optimal baseline, except that human
reason is not up to the task.'5 For example, suppose A is in a position
to prevent impending harm to B at little cost or risk to A. Is B entitled to assistance from A, or is A's assistance a benefit for which B
must pay? A quick calculation suggests that a legal duty to rescue
would encourage efficient behavior by A and that private bargaining is
unreliable.' 6 But if we look more closely and consider problems of
uncertainty and aversion to risk, costs begin to appear. Those who
prefer not to attempt rescues may give up valuable activities to avoid
potential liability.' 7 Those who like to be seen as altruists may lose
interest in performing rescues if rescue is known to be a legal duty.' 8
When a rescue is called for and none occurs, proof of legal responsibility may be costly and inaccurate.' 9 How does all this add up? The
14. If cost-justified measures are available to abate the smoke, they will be employed.
Either A will undertake them at his own expense (if B is entitled to no smoke), or B will pay A
to take them (if A is entitled to emit smoke). See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to
Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REv. 681,
729-33 (1973); Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, & Fairness:Comments on the EthicalFoundations of "JustCompensation"Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165,1196-1201 (1967); see also Lucas v.
Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2896-98 (1992) (recognizing the baseline problem).
15. On the limitations of human reason, their effects on the application of political philosophy to law, and the consequent advantages of indirect strategies of governance, see, e.g., Larry
Alexander, Pursuingthe Good-Indirectly,95 ETmcs 315 (1985); Christopher T. Wonnell, Compatibillsm & the Controversy Over End States: A Reply to Professor Waldron, 12 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'y 885 (1989); Christopher T. Wonnell, Four Challenges Facing A CompatibilistPhilosophy, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. PoL'ty 835 (1989); Christopher T. Wonnell, Problemsin the Application of PoliticalPhilosophy to Law, 86 Mic. L. REv. 123 (1987).
16. See RICaARD A. PosNER, ECONOMIC ANALYsis OF LAW § 6.9, at 174 (1986); Jay Silver,
The Duty to Rescue: A Reexamination and Proposal, 26 WM. & MARY L Rav. 423, 428-29
(1985).
17. See WLiIA M. LA"as & RICHARD A. POsNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUcruRn OF
TORT LAW 143-46 (1987); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good
Samaritans, & Other Rescuers: An Economic Study of Law & Altruism, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 83,
119-24 (1978) [hereinafter Salvors]; Saul Levmore, Waitingfor Rescue: An Essay on the Evolution & Incentive Structureof the Law ofAffirmative Obligations,72 VA. L. Rnv. 879,886,889-90
(1986).
18. Salvors, supra note 17, at 93-100, 121-22, 124; Levmore, supra note 17, at 885-86, 88990.
19. See LAtDES & PosNER, supra note 17, at 146; Salvors, supra note 17, at 124; Levmore,
supra note 17, at 933-38, 939-40; Paul H. Rubin, Costs & Benefits of a Duty to Rescue, 6 INT'L
REv. L. & ECoN. 273 (1986). A restitution alternative would avoid some of these difficulties, but
it would not be fully effective without a premium, and calculation of the premium raises
HeinOnline -- 67 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1454 1993-1994
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utilitarian theorist cannot be sure; nor can the theorist be sure he has
accounted for all the possible consequences of changing the existing
baseline distribution of rights and duties.
Thus, we agree with Epstein that law relies inevitably on baselines to distinguish harm from benefit, but we doubt that the choice of
baseline can always be explained or defended by utilitarian
calculation.
What does not follow from this, however, is the dismal conclusion
that the baselines on which law relies are arbitrary,20 nor the dangerous conclusion that baselines are in need of wholesale expert remodeling.2 ' Quite the opposite: If no baseline is "natural," then it would be
arbitrary to overturn (without good reason) the structural assumptions that support an existing system of law.
In other words, the best way out of the baseline dilemma, and
perhaps the only way out, is to concede that we are not working on a
fresh slate- 2 Law works within a system of ongoing and interconnected social institutions, with established conventions that give content to notions such as harm and benefit. There are conventional
understandings about property boundaries and causation that can tell
us, for example, whether a factory is harming a landowner or merely
failing to provide a benefit 3 We may not know exactly how or why
problems of its own. See Salvors, supra note 17, at 91-93; Levmore, supra note 17, at 886-89,
891-94.
20. See, eg., Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique,
33 STAN. L. REv. 387 (1981); Joseph William Singer, The Player & the Cards: Nihilism & Legal
Theory, 94 YALE LJ. 1 (1984). This position is eithei futile or completely destructive of the
enterprise of law.
21. See, eg., Christine A. Littleton, Restructuring Sexual Equality,75 CAL. L. REv. 1279,
1324-32 (making sex differences "costless" in the workplace); Martha Minow, Foreword-Justice
Engendered, 101 HArv. L. Rnv. 10, 70-95 (1987) (arguing that judges act as representatives,
standing in for others and symbolizing society itself); Cass R. Sunstein, Neutrality In Constitutional Law (With Special Reference to Pornography,Abortion, and Surrogacy), 92 COLUM. L.
RFv. 1, 13-48 (1992) (describing a conception of equality that accommodates beneficial partisanship on behalf of women); Roberto M. Under, The CriticalLegal Studies Movement, 96 HARv. L.
RFv. 576-602 (1983) (describing internal directional change).
22. See EDMUND BURKE, Reflections on the Revolution in France, in EDMUND BURKE:
SELECrED WRrrsNos AND SPEECHES 424 (Peter J. Stanlis ed., 1963); LON L. FULLER, Means &
Ends, in Tim PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER: SELECrED ESSAYS OF LON L. FULLER 47-64 (Ken-

neth I. Winston ed., 1981). Burke was concerned with political institutions generally; Fuller was
particularly interested in law and its role within a system of social institutions.
23. Epstein himself has relied on conventional understandings in regard to causation. See
Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151, 164 (1973) [hereinafter
Epstein, Strict Liability] (arguing that causation "is dominant in the law because it is dominant in
the language that people, including lawyers, use to describe conduct and to determine responsibility"). And he seems to return to them as a way of resolving the problem of church bells. See
HeinOnline -- 67 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1455 1993-1994

1456

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:1451

these understandings first arose, yet the law rightly relies on them in
laying down rights, duties, and liabilities.
This is by no means an argument against all change. First, the
conservative point is strongest in respect to those baselines that are of
central importance to the common law-assumptions that serve as the
conceptual starting points for large bodies of rules. Precisely what
falls into this category may be a difficult question, but surely some
baseline assumptions are so deeply embedded in the system of law
that they could not be reversed without significant consequences.24 Second, even the most central baseline assumptions should not be
taken as immutable. We should be aware of the assumptions we are
making, and we should alter them when we are sure we can do better.25 But there is reason to proceed cautiously, bearing in mind that
structural changes within a system of interdependent legal and social
institutions will have unforeseen consequences across the system. The
task is not, and never can be, to invent a system of legal and social
relations from scratch. And we ought surely to be wary of those who
would "remake the world anew" in accordance with some particular
grand theory, whether utilitarian or otherwise.26
Once past the problem of baseline, Epstein gives a persuasive
description of the ways in which the benefit principle ripples through
private law. On the public law side, he suggests that a citizen's obligation to the state, whether to pay taxes or to make other sacrifices,

Epstein, supra note 8, at 1400-1402 (arguing that customary tolerance to bells marks the boundary of compensable harm).
24. The subject of entitlement, or the incidents of particular entitlements, can be altered
without causing structural damage to the system of law. Courts can recognize a privilege to
enter property under conditions of necessity without abandoning the assumption that private
ownership carries with it the power to exclude. But suppose it were decreed that owners can no
longer exclude others from their property, or that personal efforts are collectively owned, so that
A may require B to perform any service that benefits A more than it costs B. What would follow
for the common law?
25. Here there may be something to be learned from "deconstructionist" skepticism,
although not from the anarchic or autocratic prescriptions that often accompany it.
26: For a sobering view of Jeremy Bentham, father of utilitarianism, see Gertrude Himmelfarb, The Haunted House ofJeremy Bentham, in VICrORtAN MINDs 32 (1968). Marxism has
been the leading theory for "remaking the world anew" in the twentieth century. The human
catastrophes wrought by the Soviet Marxist experiment are chronicled in, e.g., ROBERT CON.
oUEST, THE GREAT TERROR (1968); ROBERT CONQUEST, KOLYMA: THE ARTiC DEATH CAMPS
(1978); and ROBERT CONQUEST, HARVEST OF SORROW: SOVIET COLLECTVIZATION AND THE
TERROR-FAMINE (1986); and of course in ALEXANDER I. SOLZHENITSYN, THE GuLAO ARCH1.
PELAGO (Thomas P. Whitney trans., 1973).
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ought to be a sort of "restitution" for benefits received; hence the citizen ought not to be subjected to such obligations unless "foreach government action, taken separately, there is reason to believe that state
coercion provides each citizen with equal or greater benefits."2 7
Whenever the government imposes a duty on any citizen without conferring a benefit of at least equal value, the government must provide
"just compensation" to that citizen.
In order for the "restitutionary" view of a citizen's duties to be a
meaningful constraint on state power, Epstein insists that the baseline
for considering whether a citizen has been helped or hurt by the imposition of a particular duty must be the citizen's actual situation before
the duty is imposed, not, say, what the citizen's situation would be in
the "state of nature" if the taxing authorities disappeared entirely.
Epstein's focus here is firmly on the individual (What benefit is each
individual getting from a particular government program, such that
the individual is obliged to make the sacrifice for it?) unlike, interestingly, Epstein's reliance on collective-minded utilitarian social
calculus in justifying the baselines of harm and benefit in common law
principles of property.
No individual should be subjected to state coercion, says Epstein,
unless the citizen receives an equivalent benefit either from the government action itself or by way of compensation on the side. Indeed,
he says, this "strong restitution theory" ought to be "the centerpiece
of any sound system of political order."' We agree that "just compensation" is one principle that a decent state will take into account
when imposing sacrifices on its citizens, but we think that in any real
political community other considerations will sometimes trump that
principle.
War is the most obvious occasion. Human history suggests that a
political community must sometimes fight if it wants to survive. When
a state goes to war, some of its soldiers will die. And war almost
always means conscription, especially if the war goes on for any great
length of time. In wartime, in other words, the state requires some
citizens to sacrifice life itself.2 9 No "just compensation" can be provided to those who will die. Thomas Hobbes, at least, suggested that a
citizen's life is the one thing that the Leviathan cannot ask the citizen
27.

Epstein, supra note 8, at 1406.

28.

Id.

29. For a military historian's assessment of the experiences and motivations of front-line
soldiers through the ages, see JOHN KEEGAN, THE FACE OF BATTLE (1976).
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to give up.30 But that proviso is surely inconsistent with the general

tendency of Hobbes' vision, however logical it might be as a matter of
social contract theory. 1 In practice, there has to be considerable
question about the viability of any political community that cannot
sometimes demand the yery lives of some of its members.
Big public building projects are a slightly (sometimes only
slightly) less tragic example.32 Building a highway or an airport or a
large park often means that some people's neighborhoods and lives
will be broken up. Many such people will not have a Lockean property interest in physical assets "taken" for the project3 3 It seems to us
that a decent society will give some thought to the consequences of
such projects and will try to minimize the damage. But if a society
wants highways, airports, parks, or indeed anything it does not already
have, some people and some communities are liable to suffer. How is
such suffering to be quantified in order to send out compensation
checks?
Epstein might say that compensation is owed only when the citizen has suffered the "taking" of a Lockean property right.34 But
every public undertaking will call forth far broader demands for reparations if restitution and "just compensation" are truly the central
public values of a society. In such a society, it would scarcely be possible to restrict legal restitution to people whose Lockean property had
suffered a "taking," because the moral effect of enshrining restitution
so centrally would be to encourage political demands for "compensation" even where Lockean property interests are ambiguous or nonexistent. In that sort of atmosphere, desirable public projects are apt
not to be undertaken, and would-be air travellers had better hope that
30. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 111-12 (1651) ("If the Soveraign command a ma..... to
kill, wound, or mayme himselfe, or not to resist those that assault him... yet hath that man the
Liberty to disobey"; hence "to avoid battell, is not Injustice, but Cowardise.").
31.. Indeed, after arguing that no contract, including the social contract, can oblige a person
to sacrifice life, Hobbes adds illogically "[but he that inrowleth himselfe a Souldier, or taketh
imprest [i.e. conscription] mony ... is obliged, not onely to go to the battell, but also not to run
from it, without his Captaines leave." Id at 112.
32.

This might be called the Robert Moses problem. See ROBERT A.

CARO,

THE POWER

BROKER: ROBERT MosEs Am TEm
FAm. OF NEW YORK (1974) (arguing that Moses planned and
built extraordinary public works in New York, but at great social cost).
33. See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT ch. 5, §§ 27-34 (Lester
Dekoster ed., 1978) (developing a theory of property from the axiom that people properly own
their bodies, and hence have property rights in external things as well when they add their labor
to these things).
34. See generally RICHARD A. EPsrEIN,TAKINos: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENr DoMAIN (1985) (discussing Lockean property rights).
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a municipal airport was built in the pre-restitution age, because no
one will try to build one now.3"
Our point is not to reject restitution as a principle of public law,
only to take it down a peg or two from the position Epstein suggests
for it. In a real, functioning, political community, restitution is one
principle that ought to be taken seriously: it is a principle that honors
the individual and ensures against wholesale confiscations. But there
is a countervailing principle that sometimes ought to prevail: that is
the collective principle, the idea that collectivity may require sacrifice.
There are times when it is right for a society to demand sacrifices for
any number of reasons, including defense, public works, and social
justice. Sacrifice, by definition, claims no compensation. And it is
nonegalitarian as well: In a real community, or even in a private relationship, the sacrifices people have to make are hardly ever equal
ones.
Epstein insists that the public law and private law dimensions of
restitution are closely linked. If our reservations about restitution as a
principle of public law are valid, what are the implications for private
law? We suspect there may be none. But then, we are perhaps more
inclined than Epstein to think that the public and private spheres are
different, and that public and private law ought sometimes to proceed
on different principles.
II. SAUL LEVMORE ON RESTITUTION FOR
"BEST EFFORTS"
Levmore's paper presents a very interesting puzzle, which may
only be explainable in terms of conventional baselines.36 He has
noticed a group of cases in which courts seem willing to intervene to
encourage one party to take reasonable (cost-justified) steps to protect the interests of another. The setting is a contractual relation, in
which an opportunity unexpectedly arises for one "contractual
acquaintance" to avert potential harm to the other's assets.37 The

courts have entered cautiously into this area, through what Levmore
35. Any resemblance between the restitution-minded dystopia we are envisioning and
actual, fractious, litigious, contemporary America is less than entirely coincidental.
36. Careful readers may discern that the authors are not economists. It is not our object to
challenge Levmore's economic analysis; we simply offer a few supplemental suggestions from
outside the economic field.
37. Saul Levmore, Obligation or Restitutionfor Best Efforts, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 1411,141213, 1415-16 (1994).
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calls a "restitution half-step": a remedy of reimbursement for precaution-takers who succeed in preventing a loss.38
This remedy raises two questions. First, why restitution-why
have courts treated this as a case of benefit rather than harm and
declined to impose damage liability for failure to act? Second, why is
the remedy available only in case of a successful outcome, and not to
all who have taken cost-justified steps to prevent harm?
We can assume that the object of judicial intervention in this area
is to encourage parties who are in a position to prevent loss to take
cost-justified precautions. The threat of a damage remedy would
surely seem more effective for this purpose than the prospect of restitution, at least without a premium added to enhance the incentive to
act. Yet as Levmore notes, the courts have shown no inclination to
move to a stronger remedy.
Levmore identifies a number of potential costs associated with a
damage remedy, which might explain the preference for restitution.
Yet he does not seem quite satisfied that the case against damages has
been made.3 9 A damage remedy would involve the court in difficult
fact-finding, particularly on issues of causation.' Yet as Levmore
himself points out, courts regularly deal with problems of this kind. A
damage remedy also might cause potential defendants to avoid information about impending dangers. 41 This is a problem, yet perhaps not
a substantial one, since one of the conditions Levmore proposes at the
outset is that the danger be unanticipated.4 z It is also possible that a
restitution remedy would come into play more often than a damage
remedy, and hence would be more costly to administer in the long
38. Id. at 1429-30. There are a number of reasons why courts are reluctant to encourage
unsolicited services, such as the discouraging effect of judicial intervention on market transactions, and the possibility that wealth effects will bring judicial remedies into conflict with the
parties' preferences. See Saul Levmore, Explaining Restitution, 71 VA. L. Rv. 65,74-82 (1985).
Presumably these difficulties apply not only to restitution remedies for unsolicited benefits, but
also to damage liability imposed for failure to take beneficial action. But in most of the cases
Levmore describes here-cases in which the precaution-taker is specially situated to perform the
service, the service is clearly beneficial, and the need for the service was unanticipated-the
dangers of intervention are minimal. See Levmore, supra note 37, at 1416-17.
39. Levmore, supra note 37, at 1420-21, 1425.
40. Id. at 1424-25.
41. Id. at 1425-26; see also LANDES & Posr-mi, supra note 17, at 143-46 (explaining that a
rule imposing liability upon a person for failing to rescue a stranger will cause people to avoid
potential accident sites); Salvors, supra note 17, at 119-24 (same); Levmore, supra note 17, at
886, 889-90 (recognizing this effect).
42. Levmore, supra note 37, at 1416-17. If the danger is easily foreseen, the parties can
negotiate a proper allocation of risk. Id. at 1417-18.
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run. With a damage rule in place, most actors would take precautions
as required by the rule, and so avoid legal sanctions. Under a regime
of restitution, many would take precautions and claim reimbursement,
and at least some of those claims would come before the courts for
valuation. 43
The half-step limitation (the requirement of success) further
undercuts the effectiveness of restitution as a means of shaping conduct. The half-step remedy is reserved for those who are at once
altruistic, competent, and lucky." This makes it a remarkably weak
device for encouraging "best efforts" to prevent loss.4' The requirement of success might be explained on the ground that courts find it
difficult to calculate the efficiency of precautions from an ex ante perspective, and prefer to rely on ex post success as a proxy.46 But again,
courts frequently engage in calculations of efficiency, in contract as
well as in tort.47
It seems fair to say, then, that economic arguments in favor of a
limited restitution remedy as a means of encouraging loss prevention
in contract settings are not conclusive. It is at least plausible that a
damage remedy would create stronger incentives for efficient behavior without a marked increase in cost and with no grbater effect on
market transactions. This suggests 'that something other than efficiency (or at least something other than first order efficiency) is at
work, which has prevented the courts from imposing a duty to act with
accompanying liability in damages.
The explanation may simply be that courts are respecting certain
"baseline" assumptions that have a prominent place in the system of
private law and cannot be displaced without wide-ranging consequences. One such assumption, which Levmore posits as a reason for
the courts' cautious approach to "best efforts," is the divide between
43. See Wittman, supra note 7, at 62-63.
44. Actors must be altruistic because by definition, it is against the actors' interest to act
under this rule unless the probability of success is 100%. They must also be competent in order
to succeed, and they must be lucky because even if they are competent, success is not
guaranteed.
45. A damage remedy also depends on the outcome of the actors' efforts (or I'ck of
efforts): It applies only when actors are unlucky. See infra text accompanying notes 47-48. Yet
in the case of a damage remedy, outcome-dependency means only that the actors can choose to
take the risk that no loss will materialize. In the case of restitution, outcome-dependency gives
actors a reason not to take the risk at all.
46. Levmore, supra note 37, at 1438.
47. See, eg., E. ALLAN FAmSWORTH, CoNmcs 869-907 (2d ed. 1990); REsTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF CoNTmAcrs § 350 (1981).
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contract and tort law. 48 In the particular cases Levmore describes,
those in which one party to a contract has a unique and unexpected
chance to preserve the other's property from harm, there may be little
reason for courts to take a grudging "contract" attitude toward judicial intervention. Yet more generally, the categories of contract and
tort are useful points of reference that serve to alert courts to the

effects of their decisions on private bargaining. If the boundaries
between them become too obscure, this benefit will be lost.
We would point to two other conventional baselines that may
have some bearing on Levmore's puzzle. First is the notion of selfownership, which can help to explain the choice of restitution over
damages.4 9 If "best efforts" are characterized as a benefit for which

the recipient must pay, the actor controls his efforts and can choose
without penalty whether to apply them in the other's interests. If the
actor is held liable for failing to act, his efforts belong, in a sense, to
the other. Thus, a restitution remedy is faithful to the notion that
individuals own their labor and efforts and cannot be made to donate
them involuntarily to another. This principle of self-ownership may or
may not be defensible on philosophical grounds,50 and it may give way
48. Levmore, supra note 37, at 1430, 1442-43; see, eg., OLIvER WENDELL HOLMES, THE
COMMON LAW 300-303 (1881); Richard A. Epstein, Beyond Foreseeability,18 . LEGAL STUD.
105 (1989); Daniel A. Farber & John H. Matheson, Beyond Promissory Estoppek ContractLaw
and the "Invisible Handshake",52 U. CI. L. REV. 903, 905-06 & n.12 (1985).
49. See LOCKE,supra note 33, § 27. Another way to describe this intuition is to say that the
freedom to choose when and why one acts is essential to individual liberty, subject only to the
constraint that one must not interfere affirmatively with the liberty of others. See LAWRENCE C.
BECKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS: PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 39 (1977); Epstein, Strict Liability,

supranote 23, at 198-200,203-04. Epstein says: "Once forced exchanges... are accepted, it will
no longer be possible to delineate the sphere of activities in which contracts (or charity) will be
required in order to produce desired benefits and the sphere in which those benefits can be
procured as of right." Epstein, Strict Liability, supra note 23, at 199.
50. For criticism of Locke's theory of self-ownership and appropriation, see, e.g., BECKER,
supra note 49, at 36-41; JERmY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 177-83 (1988).

For criticism of libertarian baselines, see, e.g., Anthony T. Kronman, Contractlaw & Distributive
Justice, 89 YALE L$.472, 475-83 (1980) (criticizing the libertarian focus on voluntariness in
determining whether a contract is valid); see also Ronald M. Dworkin, Foundations of Liberal
Equality, in XI TANNER LECrURES ON HUMAN VALUES 1, 36-37 (1988) (arguing that justice
requires compensation for lack of "personal resources"); JoHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSnCE

72 (1971) (arguing that natural distributions of talent and ability are morally arbitrary). But cf.
Larry Alexander & William Wang, NaturalAdvantages & ContractualJustice, 3 LAw & PHIL.
281, 291-97 (1984) (defending the coherence of libertarian theory).
Whatever the difficulties of the Lockean argument for private property rights, the intuition
that labor is a basis of desert is powerful and widely held. See, e.g., Edwards v. Sims, 24 S.W.2d
619, 621-23 (1929) (Logan, J.,
dissenting); BECKER, supra note 49, at 48-56 (describing variations
on a Lockean theory).
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to overriding objectives.5 ' Yet it is an organizing principle of our system of property law, and one that could not be abandoned without
serious cost.5 2 Because self-ownership has a foundational place in the
institution of private property, courts 3have reason to honor it at the
5
expense of a small gain in efficiency.

The second legal convention that bears on Levmore's problem is
the connection between legal responsibility and the outcome of one's
actions. The apparent limit on restitution for best efforts, that the
claimant must succeed in preventing a loss, mirrors the structure of
tort liability. Just as restitution depends on success, a damage remedy
comes into play only when harm has occurred in fact. Both remedies
depend on the outcome of the actor's conduct, and not simply on its
reasonableness or efficiency at the time of action. Of course the
incentives that follow are quite different: Restitution allows the actor
to decline taking the risk, while damages force the actor either to act
or to assume the risk of loss. Yet both remedies reflect the moral
intuition that we are responsible for the outcome of our acts, even
when the outcome is partly fortuitous. 4 Right or wrong, this principle
is another of the organizing assumptions of our legal system, and one
that could not easily be overturned 55

51. See Levmore, supra note 17, at 896-97, 899-900 (describing statutory liability of hospitals and physicians, and listing "special relationships" to which a duty of assistance may attach).
52. See Frank E. Denton, The Case Against a Duty to Rescue, 4 CAN.J.L. & JtnUs. 101,
126-131 (1991) (explaining the difficulty of incorporating nonfeasance into the law of negligence); see also Richard A. Epstein, The UtilitarianFoundationsof Natural Law, 12 Hazv. J.L.
& PuB. PoL'Y 713, 727-30 (1989) (explaining the advantages of a rule of self-ownership).
53. On the relationship between utilitarian theory and rights that excuse the holder from
utilitarian calculation in particular cases, see, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, UtilitarianJustificationsfor
Observance of Legal Rights, in NOMOS XXIV: ETHICS, ECONOMICS, & Ta LAW 139, 146-47
(1982); R.M. Hare, Utility & Rights: Comment on David Lyons's Essay, in NOMOS XXIV: ETHics, ECONOMICS, & a LAW 148, 152-56 (1982); David Lyons, Utility and Rights, in NOMOS
XXIV: Encs, ECONOMICS, & Ta LAw 5,113-35 (1982).
54. See TonyHonore,Responsibility andLuck The MoralBasis of Strict Liability, 104 L.Q.
Rnv. 530, 539-45 (1988); Stephen R. Perry, Comment on Coleman: Corrective Justice, 67 IND.
LJ.381, 399 (1992); see also Thomas Nagel, Moral Luck, in MORTAL QUEsTIONs 24 (Thomas
Nagel ed., 1979) (explaining the difficulty of separating the will from its consequences).
55. For an interesting debate over the wisdom and efficiency of tort system based solely on
ex ante fault, without regard to outcome, see Christopher Schroeder, CorrectiveJustice and Liability for IncreasingRisks, 37 UCLA L. REv. 439 (1990); Christopher Schroeder, CorrectiveJustice, Liability forRisks, and Tort Law, 38 UCLA L. REv. 143 (1990); Kenneth Simons, Corrective
Justice and Liability for Risk-Creation:A Comment, 38 UCLA L. Rav. 113, 120-22 (1990); see
also STmPnmE R. PERRY, Risk, Harm & Responsibility, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
TORT LAw (David Owen ed., forthcoming) (discussing risk as harm).
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We have suggested that courts have settled for a less efficient
remedy than they might select because they are reluctant to upset conventional understandings about tort and contract, self-ownership, and
outcome-responsibility. Yet it may not follow that the courts are proceeding in a manner that frustrates efficient allocation of resources.
Some of the "baseline" conventions we have mentioned, or at least
the existence of some reliable baselines, may be preconditions to efficiency.5 6 Whether or not an economic case could be made from the
outset for adopting the particular legal conventions we have mentioned, they cannot be discarded now without significant costs. So
perhaps the puzzle is less a puzzle than it seems.

56. See supra note 15.
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